Battlegrounds Page 3

  First, great power competition was back with a vengeance, highlighted by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, invasion of Ukraine, intervention in Syria, and the sustained campaign of political subversion against the United States and the West. And it was clear that China under Chairman Xi Jinping was no longer hiding its capabilities and biding its time as the People’s Liberation Army accelerated island building in the South China Sea, tightened control of its population internally, and extended its diplomatic, economic, and military influence internationally.

  Second, the threat from transnational terrorist organizations was greater than it was on September 10, 2001. Terrorist groups were increasing their technological sophistication and lethality. They were also growing in magnitude due to slick recruiting and the perpetuation of conflict in and around the two epicenters of the war in Afghanistan and the war in Syria.

  Third, hostile states in Iran and North Korea were becoming more dangerous. The new dictator in Pyongyang aggressively pursued nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. An old dictator in Tehran expanded support for terrorists and militias across the Middle East and beyond in a way that prolonged destructive wars and increased the threat to Israel, Arab states, and U.S. interests in the Middle East.

  Fourth, new challenges to security were emerging in complex arenas of competition from space to cyberspace to cyber-enabled information warfare to emerging disruptive technologies. Moreover, a range of interconnected long-range problems demanded an integrated effort now including the environment, climate change, energy, and food and water security.

  As we began to frame those challenges as the first step toward developing integrated strategies, we paid particular attention to improving our competence. We emphasized the importance of history. Ignorance or misuse of history often led to the neglect of hard-won lessons or the use of simplistic analogies that masked flaws in policy or strategy. Understanding the history of how challenges developed would help us ask the right questions, avoid mistakes of the past, and anticipate how “the other” might respond.

  Supposition about the future should begin with an understanding of how the past produces the present. Policies and strategies must be based on the recognition that rivals and enemies will influence the future course of events. How “the other” responds will depend, in part, on their own interpretation of history. As former secretary of state and national security advisor Henry Kissinger observed, all states “consider themselves as expressions of historical forces . . . what really happened is often less important than what is thought to have happened.”20 And more than 2,500 years ago, the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu wrote, “If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.”21 So, in order to overcome strategic narcissism, we must strive to understand our competitors’ view of history as well as our own.

  Still, it does no good to improve our strategic competence if the United States and our partners do not possess the confidence to overcome new and pernicious threats to our free and open societies. To rebuild and sustain that confidence requires communicating clearly what is at stake and describing how the proposed strategies are designed to achieve sustainable outcomes at acceptable costs. This is what British prime minister Winston Churchill described as “an all-embracing view which presents the beginning and the end, the whole and each part, as one instantaneous impression retentively and untiringly held in the mind.”22 None of the competitions discussed in this book will be resolved quickly; strategies, while remaining flexible and adaptable to changing conditions, must be sustained over time. Consistency and will are, therefore, important dimensions of strategic competence.

  But our will is diminished. As our foreign policies swung from over-optimism to resignation, identity politics interacted with new forms of populism. That interaction divided us and diminished confidence in our democratic principles, institutions, and processes. We might apply empathy to ourselves as well as to the other and, as we discuss the challenges we face, seek common understanding, and work together to secure freedom and prosperity for future generations. It is my hope that this book might contribute to those discussions.

  Part I

  Russia

  MASKIROVKA . . . I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country . . . RUSSIAN JOURNALIST CRITICAL OF CHECHEN WAR IS KILLED . . . WEB BECOMES A BATTLEGROUND IN RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT . . . We only responded after 150 Russian tanks moved into Georgian territory and started open aggression . . . ПЕРЕГРУЗКА . . . RUSSIAN GENERAL PITCHES “INFORMATION OPERATIONS” AS A FORM OF WAR . . . Putin is playing chess and we are playing marbles . . . CONFRONTATION IN CRIMEA . . . You just don’t in the twenty-first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country . . . MH17 DOWNED BY RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSILE SYSTEM . . . PUTIN SAYS RUSSIA MUST PREVENT “COLOR REVOLUTIONS” . . . U.S. MOVES TO BLOCK RUSSIAN MILITARY BUILDUP IN SYRIA . . . A FIREHOSE OF FALSEHOOD . . . KREMLIN CRITIC NAVALNY ARRESTED . . . But I just asked him again, and he said he absolutely did not meddle in our election . . . TRUMP ADDS SANCTIONS TO RUSSIA OVER SKRIPALS . . . JOINT EXERCISE: VOSTOK . . . Germany hooks up a pipeline into Russia, where Germany is going to be paying billions of dollars for energy into Russia . . . RUSSIA FOLLOWS U.S. OUT OF LANDMARK NUCLEAR WEAPONS TREATY . . . THE MUELLER REPORT IS RELEASED . . . We assess there is a standing threat from the G.R.U. and other Russian intelligence services . . . RUSSIAN POLICE ARREST HUNDREDS OF PROTESTERS IN MOSCOW . . . The post-Putin Russia is being born today . . . PUTIN PROPOSES SWEEPING CHANGES TO RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION . . . TRUST IN PUTIN DROPS AS RUSSIAN ECONOMY STAGNATES . . . TRUMP BERATED INTELLIGENCE CHIEF OVER REPORT RUSSIA WANTS HIM RE-ELECTED . . .

  Chapter 1

  Fear, Honor, and Ambition: Mr. Putin’s Campaign to Kill the West’s Cow

  The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and most thoroughly, carefully, attentively, and skillfully making use without fail of every, even the smallest, “rift” among the enemies.

  —V. I. LENIN

  GENEVA IS the ideal city for a confidential diplomatic meeting. It is easy to blend in there. The city hosts more than three thousand official meetings annually, attended by more than two hundred thousand delegates. Government airplanes flow in and out of the airport. Convoys of black limousines and SUVs crisscross the city. Officials of friendly and not-so-friendly nations arrive at each other’s consulates, shake hands, and sit across from one another at long conference tables. At the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and other international organizations, my meeting in February 2018 with Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council of Russia, fell into the not-so-friendly category.

  Patrushev asked to meet me soon after I became national security advisor in early 2017. I agreed. I thought it important to open a routine channel of communication between the White House and the Kremlin below the level of Presidents Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. Russia is, of course, a nuclear power, and a strained relationship is better than no relationship, if for no other purpose than to prevent misunderstandings that might increase the chance of war. There was much to discuss.

  By 2017, it was clear that Russia was pursuing an aggressive strategy to subvert the United States and other Western democracies. Russian cyber attacks and information warfare campaigns directed against European elections and the 2016 U.S. presidential election were just one part of a multifaceted effort to exploit rifts in European and American society through propaganda, disinformation, and political subversion. As social media began to polarize the United States and other Western societies and pit communities against each other, Russian agents conducted cyber attacks and released sensitive information. Although Russian leaders routinely denied responsibility, the Kremlin was reportedly directing a sophisticated campaign.1 Russia also used cyber attacks and malicious cyber intrusions to create vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, such as in the energy sector. For example, by early 2018, the United States knew that
Russia had conducted the NotPetya cyber attack that first infected Ukraine’s government agencies, energy companies, metro systems, and banks.2 It spread later to Europe, Asia, and the Americas, costing ten billion dollars in losses and damages around the world.3

  Having studied the evolution of Russia new-generation warfare (RNGW) for years, I looked forward to talking with Patrushev to understand better the motivations behind this pernicious form of aggression that combined military, political, economic, cyber, and informational means. The day after our meeting with Patrushev, I gave a speech at the Munich Security Conference pledging that “the United States will expose and act against those who use cyberspace, social media, and other means to advance campaigns of disinformation, subversion and espionage.” During my year as national security advisor, we had worked hard to impose costs on Russia. I hoped to convince Patrushev of the dangers associated with Russia’s continued implementation of a strategy that pushed our two nations along a path toward worsening relations and potential conflict.

  The potential for conflict with Russia was growing. The civil war in Syria was a particular concern. In March 2019, Russian general Valery Gerasimov cited the Syrian Civil War as a successful example of Russian intervention to “defend and advance national interests beyond the borders of Russia.”4 The war was a humanitarian catastrophe. Russia had supported the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad since the beginning of the conflict in 2011. In August 2013, the Syrian regime used poison gas to kill more than fourteen hundred innocent civilians, including hundreds of children, but it was not its first use of chemical weapons, nor would it be the last. From December 2012 to August 2014, the Syrian regime used them against civilians at least fourteen times. Despite President Barack Obama’s declaration in 2012 that the use of these heinous weapons to murder civilians was a red line, the United States did not respond. President Putin likely concluded that America would not react to aggression. By the end of spring 2014, an emboldened Putin had annexed Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine. And then, in September 2015, Russia intervened directly in the Syrian Civil War to save Assad’s murderous regime. After another massacre with nerve agents at Khan Shaykhun in April 2017, President Trump ordered the U.S. military to strike Syrian facilities and aircraft with fifty-nine cruise missiles.5 By 2018, Russian-supported forces fighting for Assad’s regime were converging with American-supported forces fighting the terrorist group ISIS. When I met Patrushev, the danger of a direct clash between Russians and Americans on the ground in Syria was not only more likely—it had already happened.6

  On February 7, 2018, the week prior to the Geneva meeting, Russian mercenaries and other pro-Assad forces reinforced with tanks and artillery attacked U.S. forces and the Kurdish and Arab militiamen they were advising, in northeastern Syria. The mercenaries were from the company owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch known as “Putin’s cook,” a man indicted by U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller and sanctioned by the Trump administration for his role in sowing disinformation during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.7 It was an ill-conceived and poorly executed attack. U.S. forces and their Syrian Democratic Forces partners killed more than two hundred Russian mercenaries while suffering no casualties.8 Eager to suppress negative news prior to the forthcoming presidential election, the Kremlin lied about the number of casualties suffered. Putin wanted to win the election by the widest possible margin. News of a costly defeat brought on by Russia’s need to finance reconstruction of a country it had helped destroy would not help achieve this. The ultimate purpose of the Russian-led attack was to seize control of an old Conoco oil plant that promised to generate revenue and defray the costs of the war and reconstruction. No battle like that between Russians and Americans had ever occurred, even during the height of the Cold War.

  A year had passed since Patrushev suggested we meet. I had delayed in deference to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who wanted to make a personal assessment of Russia’s intentions first. Tillerson had hoped that his preexisting relationship with President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, which he developed as chief executive officer of ExxonMobil, might deliver some improvement in U.S.-Russian relations. He wanted to offer Putin an “off ramp” in Ukraine and Syria based on the assumption that those interventions, including U.S. and European economic sanctions imposed on Russia, might entice Lavrov to negotiate an eventual Russian withdrawal. In Lavrov’s case, it was not clear that he could deliver even if the possibility for improved relations existed.

  Lavrov’s approach to foreign policy was old-Soviet style, reflexively anti-Western and suspicious of new initiatives. Lavrov invariably accused the United States and the West of instigating the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, as well as large-scale protests in Russia in 2011. It seemed that Lavrov had neither the independence of mind to come up with solutions nor the latitude to make basic decisions. By early 2018, it was clear that Tillerson’s valiant efforts to find areas of cooperation with Russia had foundered. It was past time to establish a direct channel of communication between the White House and the Kremlin, other than the occasional phone calls and meetings between Trump and Putin. Since Putin had centralized power in an unprecedented way, even for a country with a long history of authoritarianism, it was important to have a relationship with someone close to Putin himself. Patrushev, Putin’s right-hand man, who occupied a position that is the Russian equivalent of national security advisor, was the ideal candidate.9

  No one on our team believed that the Geneva meeting would solve our problems with Russia. Events of the following month confirmed that belief. Soon after our meeting, Russia used a banned nerve agent in an attempted murder of a former intelligence official in Salisbury, United Kingdom, and Putin made a chest-thumping speech in which he announced new nuclear weapons. We hoped, however, that this new channel of communication between the White House and the Kremlin might lay a foundation for some bilateral diplomatic, military, and intelligence engagement with Russia across both governments. Discussions between the U.S. National Security Council staff and the Secretariat of the Security Council of Russia had existed under prior administrations. We could foster a common understanding of each nation’s interests and an awareness of where those interests diverged or converged. The two countries might then manage their differences and find some areas for cooperation. Mapping our interests might be a first step toward avoiding costly competitions or dangerous confrontations like the recent clash in Syria. At the very least, we might prepare more fully for the president’s meetings with Putin to secure favorable outcomes.

  I traveled with Dr. Fiona Hill, the National Security Council’s senior director for Europe and Russia, and Mr. Joe Wang, director for Russia. During our long flight on the “big blue plane,” as we referred to the air force Boeing 757, we discussed Vladimir Putin, Russian policy, and the man whom I would soon meet, Nikolai Patrushev. Fiona is one of the foremost experts on Russia under Putin. In her book Mr. Putin, coauthored with Clifford Gaddy, she observed that “Putin thinks, plans, and acts strategically.” She also observed, however, that “for Putin, strategic planning is contingency planning. There is no step-by-step blueprint.” Our other travel companion, Joe, a bright young State Department civil service officer of ten years, judged that prospects for a near-term improvement in U.S.-Russian relations were dim mainly due to Mr. Putin’s need for an external foe to prevent internal opposition. This need to direct the Russian people’s attention away from internal problems drove an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, while the need to generate support for that foreign policy amplified rhetoric designed to conjure the external enemy as a menace. In his March 2018 speech announcing new nuclear weapons, Putin even showed “automated videos depicting” nuclear warheads descending toward the state of Florida.

  On the plane, I recalled what I knew about Patrushev. He and Putin had a lot in common. Both entered the KGB in the 1970s. Patrushev succeeded Putin as dire
ctor of the FSB from 1999 to 2008. Putin, Patrushev, and other prominent former KGB officers who moved into influential Kremlin positions after the 2000 Russian presidential elections believed that they were the ultimate patriots. Putin trusted and relied on Patrushev. Both men understood that, especially in Russia, knowledge is power. Their base of knowledge allowed them to form a protection racket that propelled Putin to the pinnacle of power and kept him there for more than two decades. The future Russian president’s climb began in the late 1990s, when he was head of the GKU, the government’s inspectorate charged with uncovering fraud and corruption in government and federal agencies. He used that position to build dossiers on Russian oligarchs, powerful businessmen who had accumulated great wealth during the era of Russian privatization in the 1990s. He detailed their finances and business transactions. Putin had dirt on everyone. Because the rule of law had broken down in Russia, the oligarchs regarded him as an arbiter whose persuasive power derived from holding them hostage. Putin prevented infighting that might have collapsed the corrupt system and crushed all of them. When he became the head of the FSB in July 1998, he named Patrushev as head of a new Directorate of Economic Security. He and Patrushev then used their skills as KGB case officers to collect and monopolize information. In exchange for respecting the oligarchs’ property and allowing them to amass wealth, Putin expected them to act as his agents, use their business activity to promote Russian interests abroad, and comply with direction from him, their case officer, and protector.10